Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd)

We should keep that in mind while establishing relations with the new regime in Bangladesh .After a 20-year rule, 15 of them uninterrupted, Sheikh Hasina Wazed ingloriously abdicated her position as prime minister of Bangladesh and hurriedly left Dhaka for New Delhi. A dishonourable exit for an otherwise honourable leader, Sheikh Hasina was India’s steadfast friend and had become an institution unto herself.

One flank of India was truly secure as long as she ruled—the country’s longest border did not see instability with her presence in Dhaka. We knew this could not last forever, but no one could imagine such a sudden and violent change. The question is, why did this happen?

It’s important to understand Bangladesh’s internal political and social environment of the last 15 years, but it’s even more crucial to comprehend the generic social-political environment of the country since its creation.

After a violent birth as a nation, Bangladesh continued to suffer from internal conflicts between those who fought the Pakistan Army and those who cooperated with it in 1971. The latter were called ‘razakars’—the people who today bear a grudge against India.

This term was recently used by Sheikh Hasina to describe those who opposed her in the streets and perpetrated the violence. Her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s entire family was wiped out by the very people who were supposedly his supporters during the 1971 war of independence.

She escaped because of her absence from the country. Her deeply suspicious bent of mind has roots in this tragedy. It meant that she gave very little space to any opposition. Although democratic in outlook, she brooked no opposition to her rule.

Most people of her country rued this quality, although they recognised her great contribution in uplifting 25 million Bangladeshis from poverty. Banning opposition parties and conducting non-participative elections became a repeated feature.

The biggest fear perceived to be in Sheikh Hasina’s mind was of radical Islamists—the Jamaat e Islami—who she felt constantly connived with the razakars to oust her.

The Jamaat had earlier been banned by Mujibur, but was permitted to function as a political party after his death. It was banned again this August 1. Sheikh Hasina always perceived a threat from the Jamaat, which seeks Sharia law and imposition of radical Islamic practices in the social and political makeup of the Bangladeshi state.

What triggered the recent violence? It was an explosion of pent-up anger among the people, particularly the younger generations. Bland, engineered elections gave no sense of participation to the young and old.

But the issue that brought people to the streets was the now-infamous quota in the civil service and public sector jobs for the wards of freedom fighters dating back to 1972—of as much as 30 percent. Those who benefitted were a readymade vote bank for the Awami League, the grand old party of Mujibur.

In 2018, amid protests against high unemployment, Hasina herself decided to do away with the quota system. This June, when the country’s Supreme Court reimposed the quotas, she even filed an appeal against it, considering it politically insensitive.

It’s ironic that in this period the protesting students and the government of Sheikh Hasina were on the same page. Despite the convergence, there was more violence and counter-violence. Islamic radicals who have long been wishing to establish a bigger footprint here, found the right opportunity in the form of an ongoing agitation that they could energise and exploit. Hence the paradox of violence despite being on the same side of the argument.

Radical connections in Dhaka are old, but as recently as 2015, it became a major issue with failed efforts to network with the Da’ish or the Islamic State. Da’ish even attempted a terrorist attack in 2016 on a high-profile bakery in the posh Gulshan area of Dhaka, using six freshly-recruited well-educated, local young men as suicide attackers.

But why couldn’t Sheikh Hasina comprehend the fast-evolving situation in recent weeks? My understanding points to her extreme fixation with those whom she perceived were ranged against her liberal and more secular philosophy.

Her establishment probably wore blinkers while pandering to her personal threat perception, and hence did not pick up the several straws in the wind.

In terms of regional impact, there is no doubt that India hugely values stability along the 4,000-km border and a pro-Indian policy orientation of the neighbouring government.

It helped stabilise our once-restive Northeast. Her presence obviated much of Pakistan’s potential to attempt extending the arc of Islamic extremism to Bangladesh. The Chinese, who looked for investment opportunities, became Bangladesh’s largest trading partner.

With an active Sino-Indian rivalry, enabling the removal of a pro-India leader from the region would provide China the potential to further their interests with the new leadership. It’s notable that the weapons profile of the Bangladeshi armed forces is largely Chinese.

So where or who are the new leaders? In the euphoria of achieving Hasina’s ouster, the younger elements of society are currently obsessed with tearing down the parliament house and the PM’s personal quarters.

The army will not use weapons against them—rightly so. Thus, mayhem could well prevail for a few days. The Bangladesh Army is currently giving their society leeway of a kind that the latter has not witnessed in a long time. Sooner than later, it has to decide how to tackle this youth anger.

For India, there are a couple of major imponderables at this stage. It must be agreed that the perception of our country is not too positive on the streets of Bangladesh. We cannot afford to create a third adversary on our frontiers and must therefore pragmatically think through all the options.

Befriending the next government must be accompanied with an outreach to the people whose perception should be influenced by positive gestures. One thing is clear—the stability and security of Northeast India is largely dependent on the status and strength of Indo-Bangladesh relations.

The million-rupee question is where Sheikh Hasina should be given asylum in India or somewhere else. Prudence demands that India must progressively build its relationship with the new government of Bangladesh and not do anything to hamper it.

That should give an indication, although not the answer. India may host Hasina  long enough for her find alternative avenues for her eventual future,  but not forever.

(Views are personal)  Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir