Luv Puri

On the bright sunny day of March 30, 2012, I was in a beeline of visitors that included journalists, diplomats and members of the multilateral community at the picturesque Yangon residence of the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi on University Avenue Road overlooking Inya Lake.

The NLD leader, elegantly dressed and witty in conversation, was supposed to hold a press conference on the occasion of her party contesting by-elections for 48 vacant parliamentary seats on April 1. This was the NLD’s first electoral contest after it had won the 1991 election, whose results the country’s military had refused to accept.

The 2012 by-elections was a significant milestone in Myanmar’s tumultuous modern history. Aung San Suu Kyi was cautiously hopeful about the future. The Rohingya crisis in 2016 and 2017 followed by the 2021 coup ended this hope as Suu Kyi and members of her NLD-led government were arrested.

This July 31, for the sixth time, the Myanmar junta extended the state of emergency for  another six months and defended its decision that it needs time to prepare for the long-promised elections. Under the country’s 2008 Constitution, the emergency decree empowers the military to assume all state functions.

The extension was not a surprise as more than 40 percent of the country’s territory is outside the grip of the military. Most of the fierce infighting is being reported across the periphery. There are pockets of resistance even within the ethnic Bamar heartland that forms the majority of the country.

While it is difficult to pinpoint with precision the exact trajectory of the country, there are enough clues in Myanmar’s history, geography, demographics and external influences that can shed some light on present and future developments. 

A 2017 study by California-based Asia Foundation stated that “almost one quarter of Myanmar’s population hosts one or more ethnic armed organisations that challenge the authority of the central government”.

Celebrated anthropologist James Scott, who passed away recently, devised a framework to understand the periphery of Southeast Asian countries. To him, it was a “site of secessionist movements, indigenous rights struggles, millennial rebellions, regionalist agitation, and armed opposition to lowland states…

In the pre-colonial period, the resistance can be seen in a cultural refusal of lowland patterns and in the flight of lowlanders seeking refuge in the hills”, he wrote in his celebrated book, The Art of Not Being Governed. The trend continues to persist.

In northern Myanmar, particularly the Kachin area, there is no let-up in infighting. In the latest round of escalation, the military has cut phone lines and mobile services in all eight of the townships since July 21. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, an ethnic armed group, claims they may be able to get control of Lashio, one of the largest towns in northern Myanmar.

In the Southwestern region, an ethnic armed group of Rakhine Buddhists called the Arakan Army controls significant parts of Rakhine periphery. This has consequences for India as its flagship Kaladan project linking Myanmar to India’s landlocked Northeast is located here.

The external players—namely ASEAN, China and western powers—have their own interests, leverages and strategies in Myanmar. In April 2021, the ASEAN released the five-point consensus on Myanmar. At a practical level, this failed to change anything as there are internal divisions.

Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have called for tougher action against the military leadership, while Thailand expectedly continues to parallelly engage with the generals as well as Aung San Suu Kyi.

China’s shadow continues to loom over Myanmar’s political trajectory. With its knowledge of granular actors within the Myanmar leadership and opposition forces, China continues to engage with them publicly and discreetly.

Former Myanmar President General Thein Sein recently met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The  second-in-command Soe Win also recently engaged with Chinese officials. China’s special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun met with Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Than Swe in Naypyidaw in June.

Apart from the recent establishment of the first-ever caucus on Myanmar with 30 members of the US Congress to “assist US policymakers in maintaining a targeted focus on the civil war in Myanmar”, the US administration intensified its support to armed groups, particularly Kachins.

The US has historical connections with the group, considered more disciplined than other post-coup groups in the Bamar territory. The US Congress passed a Myanmar-related bill for $167 million, which includes $75 million for cross-border aid and $25 million for ‘non-lethal’ support to ethnic armed organisations and the People’s Defence Force fighting the military.

The non-lethal allocation has raised a few questions, as similar funding was given to rebels in Syria; ultimately, weapons bought through these funds ended up in the wrong hands. At the same time, the US is covertly engaging with various actors within the military-led government.

This is not a surprise, as some of the state actors are known faces. Foreign Minister Than Swe was the ambassador to the US in 2012 after restoration of the US-Myanmar diplomatic ties.

So the age-old chasm between the highlands and lowlands in Myanmar has become more violent today. Reaching a peaceful equilibrium would require accommodation and an institutional approach. Essential for this would be the military’s ability to wean away the present leadership that is corroding it from within.

 (Views are personal) Former member, UN Secretary-General’s Good Offices, Myanmar